The announcement of an India-US trade agreement has led some to ask what happened to Indian strategic autonomy. This criticism, however, misses two points. First, Indian govts have often made foreign policy trade-offs when there’s a worthwhile payoff. Second, the deals with the US and the European Union can enhance rather than weaken India’s strategic autonomy. Used effectively, they can increase India’s capabilities, without which there is no freedom of action. And they can bolster India’s ties with two actors that are essential to maintaining the diversified portfolio of partners that builds strength, deters rivals, and enhances India’s decision-making space.
Pragmatic, not Purist
The deal with the US has come in for particular criticism on the grounds that the Trump administration has linked it to India’s oil imports from Russia. It is not yet clear what New Delhi and Washington have agreed to on this issue. But it would not be surprising if India had agreed to reductions. Indian policymakers have long realised they must be pragmatic rather than purist about strategic autonomy. When necessary, they have weighed competing options and made choices—based on Indian interests.
Several Indian prime ministers, for instance, have held back in criticising partners because those ties were considered too valuable for India’s interests—including Jawaharlal Nehru in 1956 when the Soviet military cracked down in Hungary and in 1961 when the US undertook the Bay of Pigs invasion, Indira Gandhi in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 when the US invaded Iraq, Manmohan Singh in early 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, and PM Narendra Modi in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.
Such cost-benefit calculations have not just affected rhetoric but also policy. For instance, for many years, India chose not to normalise ties with Israel partly because it believed that would adversely affect ties with Arab countries, then considered more important. In 1963 and 1971, crucial agreements were signed with Washington and Moscow that prioritised Indian security over strategic autonomy concerns. In more recent years, the Singh govt pursued a civil nuclear agreement with the US despite critics alleging it would impinge on India’s independence of action. And in 2012-13, India reduced oil imports from Iran to avoid sanctions, maintain access to the western financial system, and keep the door open to deepen ties with the US.
Balancing Equations
In recent months, while not conceding on Pakistan-related asks, the Indian govt seems to have been evaluating whether the benefits of large-scale oil imports from Russia are worth the costs to India’s ties with the US (and even Europe). If it does make a decision to reduce those imports further—it seems unlikely India will or can eliminate them entirely—it would be because New Delhi has assessed that (1) there are other viable sources of oil imports, (2) it can pursue other avenues to maintain Russia ties, and most significantly (3) the Russian discount that Indian companies have been getting does not outweigh the strategic and economic benefits of striking a deal with the US.
The reality is that access to US markets, capital, know-how and technology is far more important for the Indian economy (and job creation) than any cost savings from Russian crude oil discounts. Several analysts have asserted that a trade agreement with the US will boost Indian economic growth—they only differ on the extent.
There could be broader benefits as well. The lack of a trade agreement with the US has been like a pipeline obstruction that slows down, even if it doesn’t block, the flow within. Completing a deal can unclog the channel, allowing the two countries to pick up the pace of engagement. And that cooperation has the potential to enhance Indian autonomy in several ways: increasing India’s defence, economic security and technology capabilities, making it a more attractive partner to other countries, and giving it leverage with rivals. All that, in turn, will make India more resilient over time — even against pressure from the US.
Necessity, Not Choice
Some of the criticism of the US and even EU deals is so focused on what the world can do to India that it misses what the world can do for India. This concern shaped the Modi govt’s initial approach to trade as well. But it has seemed to realise that to achieve India’s security, prosperity, status, and even autonomy objectives, opening up isn’t a choice but a necessity. Now its challenge is to create the enabling environment to make the most of the window of opportunity.
Madan is senior fellow at Brookings Institution and author, ‘Fateful triangle: How China shaped US-India relations during the Cold War
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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